Controlling market power on digital platforms: Groundbreaking changes in the competition law

The boom of super apps and e-commerce platforms has completely changed the way dominant market positions are determined. The draft amended Competition Law of 2026 has introduced new criteria to "tighten" the management of digital platform operators, prevent the abuse of a dominant position, and ensure an equal and transparent business environment.

1. Determining Market Share: No Longer Relying Solely on Revenue

In the traditional economy, market share is typically calculated based on revenue or the number of goods sold. However, for digital platforms, revenue sometimes does not accurately reflect the actual power of an enterprise. A typical example is platforms providing search services or free social networks to users, yet earning massive profits from exploiting personal data and selling advertising space.

Clause 3, Article 2 of the Draft Competition Law 2026 makes a significant step forward by supplementing the method for determining market share on digital platforms. Instead of just looking at financial figures alone, regulatory agencies will consider specific quantitative criteria of the digital economy, such as:

• Proportion of users: The percentage of buyers/sellers on the enterprise’s digital platform compared to the total number of buyers/sellers of all enterprises in the relevant market.
• Proportion of transactions: The percentage of the number of transactions executed on the enterprise’s digital platform compared to the total number of transactions on the digital platforms of all enterprises in the relevant market.
• Transaction value: The total transaction value on the digital platform compared to the entire market. This is an extremely important indicator that more accurately reflects the influence and dominant power of e-commerce platforms or ride-hailing and food delivery apps.

2. Identifying “Significant Market Power” in the Digital Age

In addition to quantitative criteria, the Draft has supplemented a series of new qualitative factors in Article 26 to comprehensively assess whether an enterprise holds a dominant market position; typical new factors include:

• User data: The ability to collect, accumulate, control, process, and exploit user data, transaction data, and market data on the digital platform. In practice, data helps platforms understand user behavior better than anyone else, thereby creating a massive information barrier against new competitors wishing to enter the market, yielding a special competitive advantage.
• Network effects: The degree and scope of direct or indirect network effects of the digital platform. A typical factor is that the more users a social network has, the more new users it attracts, leading to an environment that draws activity for buyers/sellers and increasingly boosts the market share value of that digital platform. Simultaneously, this creates a massive barrier to market entry for new competitors.
• Algorithms & Artificial Intelligence (AI): The ability to use algorithms, artificial intelligence, or other digital technologies to coordinate, and control transactions, prices, or user behavior in the market. Accordingly, using algorithms to prioritize one’s own products or “squeeze” user prices will be targeted by regulatory agencies.

3. Prohibited Acts of Abusing a Dominant Position

A notable new point in Article 27 of the Draft is the official prohibition of digital platform operators from engaging in “Self-preferencing” practices. Specifically, enterprises are not allowed to use algorithms or display rankings to prioritize their own products and services or those of affiliated companies over competitors on the same platform.

This practice is not new and has been the focus of many shocking antitrust lawsuits worldwide in recent years, such as the Google Shopping case in the European Union (EU) where the European Commission issued a decision to fine Google for using its search algorithm to prominently display its own comparison shopping service (Google Shopping) while demoting the rankings of rival comparison shopping services.

In Vietnam, including “Self-preferencing” in the list of prohibited acts of abusing a dominant position will bring immense practical impact. This regulation will prevent e-commerce platforms, ride-hailing apps, or food delivery apps from using algorithms to prioritize displaying “in-house” storefronts or strategic partners. Thereby, it ensures all enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have the opportunity to access customers fairly, based on the actual quality of products and services rather than their relationship with the platform operator.

LS Law Firm, with a team of lawyers specializing in Competition and Technology Law, is ready to assist enterprises in assessing risks and complying with these new regulations.

LS LAW FIRM

Reference sources:
(1) Draft Law amending and supplementing a number of articles of the Commercial Law, Competition Law, Law on Foreign Trade Management, and Law on Protection of Consumers’ Rights (2026).

(2) The concept of Gatekeeper in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and the possibility of its adoption into Vietnam’s competition law.